Applications and Applied Mathematics: An International
Journal (AAM)
Volume 14

Issue 1

Article 11

6-2019

New Approach of Deterministic Key Pre-distribution Scheme
Using Triangle Free Quasi Symmetric Designs
Debashis Ghosh
C. V. Raman College of Engineering

Joydeb Pal
National Institute of Technology, Durgapur

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pvamu.edu/aam
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons, and the Discrete Mathematics and Combinatorics
Commons

Recommended Citation
Ghosh, Debashis and Pal, Joydeb (2019). New Approach of Deterministic Key Pre-distribution Scheme
Using Triangle Free Quasi Symmetric Designs, Applications and Applied Mathematics: An International
Journal (AAM), Vol. 14, Iss. 1, Article 11.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pvamu.edu/aam/vol14/iss1/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @PVAMU. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Applications and Applied Mathematics: An International Journal (AAM) by an authorized editor of
Digital Commons @PVAMU. For more information, please contact hvkoshy@pvamu.edu.

Ghosh and Pal: Pre-distribution Scheme Using Triangle Free Quasi Symmetric
Available at
http://pvamu.edu/aam
Appl. Appl. Math.
ISSN: 1932-9466

Applications and
Applied Mathematics:
An International Journal
(AAM)

Vol. 14, Issue 1 (June 2019), pp. 188 - 198

New Approach of Deterministic Key Pre-distribution Scheme
Using Triangle Free Quasi Symmetric Designs
1

Debashis Ghosh and 2Joydeb Pal
1

Department of Mathematics
C. V. Raman College of Engineering
Bhubaneswar, Orissa – 752054, India
ghoshdebashis10@gmail.com
2

Research Scholars
Department of Mathematics
National Institute of Technology
Durgapur, West Bengal, India
joydebpal77@gmail.com
Received: September 12, 2018; Accepted: March 29, 2019

Abstract
A wireless sensor network (WSN) consists of tiny autonomous sensor nodes with some
constraints. There are organizations having moderately necessitates of these kind of networks.
So, security become an indispensable concern in WSN, due to potential adversaries. To
overcome the security problem, keys are pre-loaded to the nodes before deployment. Among
all key distribution schemes, deterministic key pre-distribution scheme (KPS) using
combinatorial design is efficient regarding security aspect. In this paper, a deterministic
approach, based on combinatorial design, for key assignment before the network deployment
has been presented. Here the quasi-symmetric design which is of triangle-free is being used to
present the new KPS for sensor networks. Due to this approach each sensor node either will
contain a key-chain or will communicate through a key-path. This will improve the resiliency
and achieve the sufficient level of security in the network. This design can also be used when
a large number of nodes are being deployed in WSN.

Keywords: Triangle-free Quasi-symmetric designs; Sensor network; Key pre – distribution
scheme; Resiliency

MSC 2010 No.: 05B05, 94C30
1.

Introduction

Recent advances in wireless communications for civilian as well as military operations, have
paved the way for the proliferation of WSN. The distributed adhoc sensor networks which are
collection of inexpensive sensor devices having low battery power, low computational speed,
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low storage capacity and others limited resources. Because of these constraints and wide area
of sensitive applications, security becomes a challenging issue for sensor networks see Zhou et
al. (2008). As a consequence, it is infeasible to use traditional pairwise key establishment
techniques based on the complex arithmetic of large integers given by Chakrabarti et al. (2006).
Therefore, a scheme has called for to intercommunicate among the sensor nodes and relay the
massage to its base station securely, known as KPS. Over the last two decades, a sequence of
research work dealt with key distributions for WSN and many solutions have been proposed
keeping various aspect in mind. Based on the assignments of keys to sensor nodes, researchers
have categorized the key pre-distribution approach to the problem of key establishment, prior
to deployment, into three categories: probabilistic see Du et al. (2005), Eschenauer & Gligor
(2002) and Liu & Ning (2003), for deterministic see Blom (1984), Camtepe & Yener (2007),
Dong et al. (2008), Hazra et al. (2015), Lee and Stinson (2004), Pietro et al. (2004), Ruj and Roy
(2007) and Shafiei et al. (2008) and for hybrid see Camtepe & Yener (2007), Chakrabarti et
al. (2006), and Modh et al. (2015). Here, we present a deterministic key pre-distribution scheme
for WSN.
Key pre-distribution scheme is a means of specifying which node stores which key-rings
according to previous arrangement of keys before deployment. These schemes essentially
involve a trade-off between the competing requirements of low memory usage, high network
connectivity and resilience against adversaries who capture nodes and steal the keys stored in
nodes. This scheme consists of three phases, key distribution, shared key discovery, and path
key establishment. Every sensor node is initially loaded with a fixed number of keys and
assigned to a unique key identifier. After the deployment of the distributed sensor nodes, the
shared-key discovery phase takes place, where any two nodes in wireless communication range
exchange their list of key identifiers to each other, and look for their common keys. If they
share one or more common keys, they can pick a set of keys for cryptographic communication.
The path-key establishment phase takes place if there is no common key between a pair of
nodes. Then a sequence of nodes constitute the path. To establish a secure path with node 𝐵𝑗 ,
a node 𝐵𝑖 needs to find a path between itself and the node 𝐵𝑗 such that any two adjacent nodes
in the path have common key. Thus, messages from the node 𝐵𝑖 can reach to the node 𝐵𝑗
securely.
The key pre-distribution scheme based on combinatorial designs determines how many chosen
keys to designate to key chain before the sensor network deployment. This scheme becomes
an emerging research area due to the arrangement of elements of finite sets into subsets
satisfying various properties. Eschenauer & Gligor proposed the basic random key predistribution scheme in Eschenauer & Gligor (2002). In this scheme, two nodes will compute
pair wise key only if they share a certain number common keys, which is pre-specified. Then
each node will be pre-loaded with a key ring of 𝑘 keys randomly selected from a large pool S
which is deduced by the key derivation function. After the deployment step, if two neighbors
share at least one key, they establish a secure link and compute their session secret key which
is generated from the common key. Otherwise, if neighboring nodes do not have common keys,
they should determine secure paths which are composed of successive secure links. This basic
approach is CPU and energy efficient but it requires a large memory space to store the key ring.
Moreover, if the network nodes are progressively corrupted, the attacker may discover a large
part or the whole global key pool. Hence, a great number of links will be compromised. In the
year 2004, Camtepe & Yener suggested the deterministic key pre-distribution scheme using
projective planes, generalized quadrangle and symmetric BIBD and analyze the security and
connectivity properties like scalability and resiliency of the scheme in Camtepe and Yener
(2007). By that time, Lee and Stinson have also used the concept of Transversal Design for key
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pre-distribution in WSN, independently given in Lee & Stinson (2004). On studying and
simulating the scheme provided by Lee & Stinson, can be chosen to vary the resilience,
connectivity and storage requirements of the KPS. They also describe how the resilience of the
scheme can be increased by combining a transversal design with Blom’s method in Blom
(1984), to construct a KPS, which they term as multiple space scheme. Chakrabarti, Roy, and
Maitra provide a new scheme, where they randomly choose 𝑥 number of blocks and merged to
form a new node in Chakrabarti et al. (2006). They have chosen the blocks in such a way that
there will be no inter node connectivity. As they have chosen randomly, for some cases they
could not avoid the occurrence of inter node connectivity. After forming a number of nodes
they revised their scheme by introducing 𝑀𝑂𝑉𝐸 function to increase connectivity between
different pairs in the network. 𝑀𝑂𝑉𝐸 increases the connectivity by exchanging blocks between
maximum linked pair with zero linked pair. Later various combinatorial objects are being used
to design KPS to develop security and performance in load distribution, such as Partially
balanced incomplete block designs and Reed-Solomon codes were suggested in 2007 by Ruj
& Roy, Orthogonal arrays and 3-designs were suggested in 2008 by Dong et al. and many
more. Beside these schemes and to reduce hops and hence potential risks from node capture, it
is more important to have connected networks that cannot be guaranteed by random schemes.
So we opt for deterministic protocols for security applications in networks that ensure high
connectivity.
Here we have designed a KPS scheme based on combinatorial designs. The pioneering work
of Camtepe & Yener proposes a deterministic pairwise KPS with the help of combinatorial
objects such as symmetric designs and generalized quadrangles. There Balanced Incomplete
Block Designs are mapped to obtain efficient key distribution schemes. They have shown that
the combinatorial approach produces better connectivity with smaller key-chain sizes. Further
study in this context can be found in Du et al. (2005), Lee and Stinson, (2004), Shafiei et al.
(2008) or Zhou et al. (2008).
On the other hand, combinatorial design theory is an arrangement of a set of elements under
some specific rules. Such rules are pre-defined by the parameters of design theory see Ghosh
& Dey (2015) and Shrikhande & Sane (1991). Designs are analyzed by the study of these
parameters. As of application in this area, each node need not be stored the keys of all other
nodes and hence the storage overhead of the network be reduced.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 devoted to the mathematical
foundation and established the relation between combinatorial design and key distribution
model. Also some previous works relevant to KPS scheme are reviewed in this section. In
Section 3, we introduce our suggested scheme with relevant phases using triangle-free quasisymmetric design. In the succeeding subsection we address the security issues. Finally in
section 4, we conclude with future Plan.
2. Mathematical Foundation
The subject combinatorial design found its application initially in the design of experiments in
statistics in the year 1930. Then the rapid advances in design theory can be attributed in large
degree to its impetus from application in coding theory and communication. Also combinatorial
design techniques have been used in numerous other areas such as Boolean function,
authentication code, cryptography etc. with deep interactions with geometry, algebra, number
theory and graph theory. For detail on these areas where combinatorial designs have been used,
one can refer Cameron and Lint (1991) and Colbourn and Dinitz (2007).
2.1. Quasi-symmetric 𝟐-Design
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Combinatorial objects become a rich field of practical application in wireless communication.
Balanced Incomplete Block Design (BIBD) is one such among them.
Definition 2.1.1.
A design is a pair(𝑋, 𝐴), where 𝐴 is a set of subsets of 𝑋, called blocks. The elements of 𝑋 are
called varieties. A BIBD (𝑣, 𝑏, 𝑟, 𝑘, 𝜆) or 2-design is an incidence structure which satisfies the
following conditions:
(1) |𝑋| = 𝑣, |𝐴| = 𝑏.
(2) Each subset in 𝐴 contains exactly 𝑘 varieties.
(3) Each variety in 𝑋 occurs in 𝑟 many blocks.
(4) Each 2-subset of varieties in 𝑋 is contained in exactly 𝜆 blocks in 𝐴.
A BIBD (𝑣, 𝑏, 𝑟, 𝑘, 𝜆) design can be represented by an incidence matrix 𝑀 = (𝑚𝑖𝑗 ) of
dimension 𝑣 × 𝑏 with entries 0 and 1, where 𝑚𝑖𝑗 = 1, if the 𝑖 𝑡ℎ variety is in the 𝑗 𝑡ℎ block, and
0 otherwise. The parameters are related by themselves as 𝜆(𝑣 − 1) = 𝑟(𝑘 − 1) and 𝑏𝑘 = 𝑣𝑟.
For 0 ≤ 𝑥 < 𝑘, 𝑥 is called the block intersection number, if there exists 𝐵, 𝐵 ′ ∈ 𝐴 such that
|𝐵 ∩ 𝐵′| = 𝑥. A symmetric design is a 2-(𝑣, 𝑘, 𝜆) design such that 𝑏 = 𝜆0 = 𝑣 and 𝑟 = 𝜆1 = 𝑘
and any 2 blocks intersect in 𝜆 points. Now a slight generalization in the above definition will
be sufficiently broad to include all symmetric designs. That generalization has been done in
Fisher's inequality by 𝑏 ≥ 𝑣.
Definition 2.1.2.
A 2-design with exactly two intersection numbers is said to be quasi-symmetric 2-design.
We denote these intersection numbers by 𝑥 and 𝑦, and assume to be 0 ≤ 𝑥 < 𝑦 < 𝑘. Here we
will consider the proper quasi-symmetric design, i.e., both the intersection numbers are positive
and not equal. So, for an example of quasi-symmetric design is symmetric design with some
new additional blocks, where the blocks are intersecting either at 𝜆 points or nowhere. Again
let 𝐷 be a multiple of a symmetric 2-(𝑣, 𝑘, 𝜆) design. Then 𝐷 is a quasi-symmetric 2-design
with 𝑥 = 𝜆 and 𝑦 = 𝑘 Ghosh & Dey (2015). For details reading on design theory, we refer to
Shrikhande (1986).
Example 2.1.1.
For simplicity we consider the following parameter of design






𝑣 = 22
𝑘 = 6
𝜆= 5
𝑟 = 21
𝑏 = 77

With 𝑥 = 0 and 𝑦 = 2 as intersection numbers. Then, the computer search result gives the
blocks as,
𝐴 = {123456; 12789𝑎; 12𝑏𝑐𝑑𝑒; 12𝑓𝑔ℎ𝑖; 12𝑗𝑘𝑙𝑚; 137𝑏𝑓𝑖; 138𝑐𝑔𝑘; 139𝑑ℎ𝑙;
13𝑎𝑒𝑖𝑚; 147𝑐ℎ𝑚; 148𝑏𝑖𝑙; 149𝑒𝑓𝑘; 14𝑎𝑑𝑔𝑗; 157𝑑𝑖𝑘; 158𝑒ℎ𝑗; 159𝑏𝑔𝑚; 15𝑎𝑐𝑓𝑙;
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167𝑒𝑔𝑙; 168𝑑𝑓𝑚; 169𝑐𝑖𝑗; 238𝑏ℎ𝑚; 16𝑎𝑏ℎ𝑘; 237𝑐𝑖𝑙; 238𝑏ℎ𝑚; 239𝑒𝑔𝑗; 23𝑎𝑑𝑓𝑘;
247𝑏𝑔𝑘; 248𝑐𝑓𝑗; 249𝑑𝑖𝑚; 24𝑎𝑒𝑓𝑙; 257𝑒𝑓𝑚; 258𝑑𝑔𝑙; 259𝑐ℎ𝑘; 25𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑗; 267𝑑ℎ𝑗;
268𝑒𝑖𝑘; 269𝑏𝑓𝑙; 26𝑎𝑐𝑔𝑚; 3478𝑑𝑒; 349𝑎𝑏𝑐; 34𝑓𝑔𝑙𝑚; 34ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑘; 357𝑎𝑔ℎ; 3589𝑓𝑖;
35𝑏𝑒𝑘𝑙; 35𝑐𝑑𝑗𝑚; 3679𝑘𝑚; 368𝑎𝑗𝑙; 36𝑏𝑑𝑔𝑖; 36𝑐𝑒𝑓ℎ; 458𝑎𝑘𝑚; 4579𝑗𝑙; 45𝑏𝑑𝑓ℎ;
45𝑐𝑒𝑔𝑖; 467𝑎𝑓𝑖; 46𝑏𝑒𝑗𝑚; 46𝑐𝑑𝑘𝑙; 5678𝑏𝑐; 4689𝑔ℎ; 569𝑎𝑑𝑒; 56𝑓𝑔𝑗𝑘; 56ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑚;
78𝑓ℎ𝑘𝑙; 78𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑚; 79𝑏𝑒ℎ𝑖; 79𝑐𝑑𝑓𝑔; 7𝑎𝑏𝑑𝑙𝑚; 7𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑗𝑘; 89𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑚; 8𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑔; 89𝑏𝑑𝑗𝑘;
8𝑎𝑐𝑑ℎ𝑖; 9𝑎𝑓ℎ𝑗𝑚; 9𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑘𝑙; 𝑏𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑘𝑚; 𝑏𝑐𝑔ℎ𝑗𝑙; 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑙; 𝑑𝑒𝑔ℎ𝑘𝑚}.
Quasi-symmetric designs are also represented by the block graph Γ. Here vertices of Γ are the
blocks of the design and two vertices are adjacent if they have 𝑦 number of common verities.
The parameters of Γ(𝑏, 𝑎, 𝑐, 𝑑) are related with the parameters of quasi-symmetric design
Shrikhande (1986) as
𝑎=

k(r − 1) + x(1 − b)
(y − x)

,

𝑐 = 𝑎 + 𝜇1 𝜇2 + 𝜇1 + 𝜇2 , 𝑑 = 𝑎 + 𝜇1 𝜇2 ,
𝑟−𝜆−𝑘+𝑥
𝜇1 =
,
𝑦−𝑥
𝑥−𝑘
𝜇2 =
.
𝑦−𝑥
Let 𝑀 and 𝑁 denote the incidence matrix and adjacency matrix of the design respectively. Then
with the help of these, a matrix 𝑃 can be formed as
0
𝑀′

𝑃=(

𝑀
).
𝑁

Consider the complement of strongly regular graph Γ(𝑏, 𝑎, 𝑐, 𝑑), denoted by ̅Γ, is again a
strongly regular graph with parameters (𝑏, 𝑏 − 𝑎 − 1, 𝑏 − 2𝑎 + 𝑑 − 2, 𝑏 − 2𝑎 + 𝑐). A
strongly regular graph Γ is said to be triangle-free iff 𝑐 = 0, i.e., the graph contains no cycle of
length 3. A quasi-symmetric design is said to be triangle-free, if the complement of Γ i.e.,
Γ̅ does not contain a triangle or equivalently the design has no three mutually disjoint blocks.
Theorem 2.1.1. [Shrikhande (1986)]
Let 𝐷 be a quasi-symmetric design (v, b, r, k, λ) with block intersections x and y (x ≠ y). Let
M and N be the incidence matrix and adjacency matrix of the design 𝐷. Let 1v and 0b be row
vectors of all 1’s and 0’s respectively. Then, 𝑃 will represent a strongly regular graph
if and only if 𝐷 has parameters,
v = y(y 2 + 3y + 1),
b = (y 2 + 2y − 1)(y 2 + 3y + 1), r = (y + 1)(y 2 + 2y − 1),
(y ≥ 1).
k = y(y + 1),
λ = y(y + 1) − 1,
x = 0,
y,
Moreover, the only strongly regular graph P so obtained are so-called "Negative Latin Square
graphs" NLy (y 2 + 3y) with parameters ((y 2 + 3y)2 , y(y 2 + 3y + 1), 0, y(y + 1)).

Example 2.1.2.
Consider the design 𝐷 with parameters (𝑣, 𝑘, 𝜆, 𝑏, 𝑟) = (22, 6, 5, 77, 21) is a quasi-symmetric
design as in Example 2.1.1. Its corresponding parameter of the strongly regular graph is:
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𝑏 = (y 2 + 3y)2 = 100, a = y(y 2 + 3y + 1) = 22, c = 0, d = y(y + 1) = 6.
Since it contains no cycle of length 3, so this also represents a triangle-free strongly regular
graph. The figure of which is given below in Figure 1.

Figure 1: A Figure of tf-SRG
Here we are interested with the set of parameters of triangle-free quasi-symmetric designs to
represent the key distribution scheme. A quasi-symmetric design here refers to 2-design with
precisely two block intersection numbers 0 and 𝑦.
2.2. Correspondence between Quasi-symmetric designs and Key Distribution.
Once the network size (denoted by 𝑏) and the number of keys per node (denoted by 𝑘) are
specified, the centre chooses a regular, uniform design of rank 𝑘, say (𝑋, 𝐴), having exactly 𝑏
blocks. The design (𝑋, 𝐴) is used as the key ring space. The key ring space is used as a key
pre-distribution scheme for a network having 𝑏 nodes. Let the sensor nodes be denoted
by 𝑉1 , 𝑉2 , … , 𝑉𝑏 . Let
𝑋 = {𝑥𝑖 |1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑣}
and
𝐴 = {𝐴𝑗 |1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑏}.
The 𝑣 points in 𝑋 have 1 − 1 correspondence with a set of 𝑣 keys, as follows: For 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑣,
a key, denoted by 𝐾𝑖 , is chosen uniformly at random from some specified key-space, say 𝑆
(e.g. = {0, 1}256 ). Then, for each 𝑗, 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑏, the sensor node 𝑉𝑗 receives the set of 𝑘 keys
{𝐾𝑖 ∶ 𝑖 ∈ 𝐴𝑗 }.
Here, each point 𝑥𝑖 work as the key identifier for 𝐾𝑖 and each block 𝐴𝑗 identify the key set that
is assigned to the node 𝑉𝑗 . Such scheme is familiar with Eschenauer & Gligor (2002), where
key ring space is the subset of all k – subset from 𝑋. The variation of our model is the nonexistence of 3 mutually disjoint blocks i.e., the complement of the block graph does not contain
any triangle, which reduces the storage overhead of the said network. Thus the correspondence
between the design and KPS given in the following table.

Table 1. Corresponding between design and KPS
Quasi-symmetric designs
Point set

https://digitalcommons.pvamu.edu/aam/vol14/iss1/11
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Point set size 𝑣

Key space size (|𝑆|)

Block

Key ring

# blocks (𝑏)

# key-chain or # key ring, # nodes

# points in a block

# 𝐾𝑖 in key-chain

# blocks that a point is in

# key-chains that a key is in

Two blocks adjacent for 𝑦
points in common

Two nodes communicate for 𝑦
keys are common

The effectiveness of a sensor network can be explained by the following two aspects:
 The connective probability 𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 , which is defined by the probability that any pair of
sensor nodes shares a link i.e., they have exactly 𝑦 common keys. By this the effectiveness
of the sensor network is measured.
 The probability 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙(1), this is defined by if a sensor node is detected as being
compromised, then all the keys it possesses should no longer be used by any node in the
sensor networks. Such probability is defined by,
𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙(1) =

the losted connectivies
,
the connectivities remains

Given two nodes have at least 𝑦 common keys; they use all their common keys to compute
their pairwise key, by means of an appropriate key derivation function.
3.

New Scheme

For the key distribution among the sensor nodes, the combinatorial design has been
implemented, known as quasi-symmetric 2-design, which is a slight generalization of
symmetric design. Let (𝑋, 𝐵) be a combinatorial design with |𝑋| = 𝑣 and every block 𝐵 ′ in 𝐵
containing 𝑘 number of elements of 𝑋. If any pair of elements of 𝑋 occurs in 𝜆 number of
blocks, then it is called 2 - (𝑣, 𝑘, 𝜆) design. If in addition, any pair of blocks intersect one of
two distinct number of points of 𝑋, say 𝑥 and 𝑦, then it is known as quasi-symmetric 2-design.
Here we consider the quasi-symmetric design having non-trivial intersection number, i.e., 𝑦 >
𝑥 ≥ 0.
Lemma 3.1. [Shrikhande & Sane (1991)]
Let (x, B) be a non flag of a triangle-free quasi-symmetric design D and suppose α(x, B) is
the number of blocks on x not meeting B. Then,
𝛼(𝑥, 𝐵) = 𝑟 − 𝑚𝜆
for any integer m, its value is restricted by 2 ≤ m ≤ y + 1.

Theorem 3.2.
Let D be a quasi-symmetric design with block intersection numbers 0 and y. Suppose D has no
three mutually disjoint blocks. Then the parameters of D can be expressed as follows:
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b = (y 2 + 2y − 1)(y 2 + 3y + 1),
k = y(y + 1),

λ = y 2 + y − 1.

Remark 3.3.
The above 𝐷 become a triangle-free quasi-symmetric 2-Design. With the help of this design
we can construct a key pre-distribution scheme.
Consider the sensor network having 𝑏 number of nodes and therefore 𝑏 numbers of key–chains
are there. Each key-chain can store at most 𝑘 number of keys coming from a key-pool 𝑋. Since
each key presents in 𝑟 number of blocks. But we establish the link among the nodes for exactly
𝑦 keys are common.
3.1. Algorithm 1
Following algorithm describe the triangle-free quasi-symmetric designs.
Require: Choose 𝑦 an integer ≥ 2
 Calculate 𝑣 = 𝑦(𝑦 2 + 3𝑦 + 1).
 Calculate 𝑘 = 𝑦(𝑦 + 1).
 Calculate 𝑏 = (𝑦 2 + 2𝑦 − 1)(𝑦 2 + 3𝑦 + 1).
 Establish 𝑟 = 𝑣 − 1 and 𝜆 = 𝑘 − 1.
 Calculate 𝜇1 and 𝜇2 .
 Calculate 𝑎 = 𝑏 + 𝜇1 𝜇2 − 2.
 Calculate 𝑐 = 𝑎 + 𝜇1 𝜇2 + 𝜇1 + 𝜇2 .

Establish the link between the two nodes provided they have 𝑦 number of common
keys.
3.2. Storage Overhead
When using the proposed triangle-free quasi-symmetric design based version matching with
strongly regular graph of uniform rank 𝑘, each node is pre-loaded with one key ring
corresponding to one block from the design. Hence, each node is pre-loaded with 𝑦(𝑦 + 1)
number of keys. The memory required to store keys is, then, 𝑙 ⋅ 𝑦(𝑦 + 1) where 𝑙 is the key
size.
3.3. Network Scalability
From construction, the total number of possible key rings when using the triangle-free quasisymmetric design based scheme is 𝑏 = (𝑦 2 + 2𝑦 − 1)(𝑦 2 + 3𝑦 + 1), this is then the
maximum number of supported nodes.

3.4. Session Key Sharing Scheme
When using the mapping of quasi-symmetric design, we know that each key is used in exactly
𝑦(𝑦 2 + 3𝑦 + 1) key rings among the (𝑦 2 + 2𝑦 − 1)(𝑦 2 + 3𝑦 + 1) possible key rings. Let us
consider two nodes 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 selected randomly. The node 𝑥1 is pre-loaded with a key ring
𝐴𝑥1 of 𝑦(𝑦 + 1) different keys and that of 𝑥2 is pre-loaded with a key ring 𝐴𝑥2 of same number

https://digitalcommons.pvamu.edu/aam/vol14/iss1/11

8

Ghosh and Pal: Pre-distribution Scheme Using Triangle Free Quasi Symmetric
196

Debashis Ghosh and Joydeb Pal

of keys. Now these pair of nodes may have no common key or they have 𝑦 number of keys in
common. Therefore, the nodes will be adjacent, provided they have 𝑦 number of keys in
common. Now from the idea of strongly regular graph, two adjacent nodes have exactly 𝑐
common neighbors. Again, Γ̅ represents triangle-free quasi-symmetric designs with above
parameters also generate a negative Latin square graph where two adjacent nodes have no
common neighbor, since triangle-free strongly regular graph does not contain any cycle of
length 3. On the other hand, for two non-adjacent nodes have 𝑦(𝑦 2 + 4𝑦 + 2) number of
common neighbours. These will help to construct the key-path.
Each key is contained in 𝑣 − 2 other key rings. Knowing that each pair of keys occur together
in exactly (𝑦 2 + 𝑦 − 1) blocks, we find that the blocks containing 𝑦 + 1 different keys of 𝐴𝑥1
are completely disjoint. Hence, each node shares exactly one key with 𝑦 3 + 3𝑦 2 + 𝑦 − 2 nodes
among the 𝑦 3 + 3𝑦 2 + 𝑦 − 1 other possible nodes. Therefore, the number of links established
for a node is 𝑦(𝑦 + 1). Let 𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 be the probability of any two nodes sharing exactly 𝑦 keys
to form a secure connection. Then
𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 =

𝑦(𝑦 + 1)
.
𝑏

3.5. Resiliency against random node compromise.
Security is the major issue of wireless sensor network. Security problem incorporated in WSN
due to various constrained as storage capacity, low computational power, large number of
nodes in the network, wireless type of communication etc. Here, we have tried to evaluate a
new scheme in terms of its resilience against node collusion and selective node capture attack.
But resiliency contradicts to the probability of key share because as many blocks are effected,
as the number of more keys are shared among the nodes when a block is compromised. If a
node is directly involved in node collusion, e.g., because of being captured by an outside
adversary or reprogrammed to do harm to the whole network, we say the node is compromised.
Mathematically this can be calculated as
𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙(1) =

𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑠 𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑
(𝑁−𝑠)(𝑁−𝑠−1)
2

,

where, 𝑁 is the size of the network. In case of selective node capture attack, the attacker
comprises those nodes whose keys have not already been compromised. Amid shared key
discovery phase only node identifiers are broadcasted, key identifiers are not exchanged. Hence
attacker at any stage cannot know which key identifiers are present in which node. Thus
attacker cannot gain any information using this attack. The Table 2 gives a list of value of
probability 𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 and 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙(1) of our scheme.

Table 2. Comparison for various numbers of nodes
𝑦
𝑏
𝑣
𝑘
𝑠
𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙(1)
4
667 116
20
7
0.2121 0.00064
5
1394 205
30
11
0.2386 0.00034
6
2585 330
42
16
0.2615 0.00020
7
4402 497
56
27
0.3456 0.00015
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7031

712

197

72

37

0.3809

0.00011

Conclusion

All key management techniques have their own benefits as well as shortcomings. In this paper,
a new highly scalable key pre-distribution scheme for WSN has been proposed. We make use,
for the first time, of the triangle-free quasi-symmetric design to improve the resiliency. We
showed that a basic mapping from quasi-symmetric designs to key pre-distribution allows
achieving extremely high network scalability while improving the key sharing probability. We
proposed then an enhanced quasi-symmetric design based construction which gives birth to a
new key management scheme providing high network scalability and good key sharing
probability. We conducted analytic calculation and showed that our approach enhances
significantly the network scalability when providing good overall performances. As future
work, we plan to deepen the analysis of our parameter choice in order to suggest values given
the best trade-off. Furthermore there is lot of chances in this field so that constrained resources
of wireless sensor network can be efficiently used and network utilization can be improved.
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